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ARTICLES
THE MARRAKESH TREATY FOR VISUALLY
IMPAIRED PERSONS: WHY A TREATY WAS
PREFERABLE TO SOFT LAW
Margot E. Kaminski* & Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid**

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the debates leading up to the recently adopted
international treaty on copyright exceptions for the visually impaired, the
Marrakesh International Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled. This treaty was
successfully adopted by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in
June 2013.
Leading up to the negotiation of this instrument, multiple UN member states
pushed for the instrument to be negotiated as soft law instead of a treaty. We argue
that making this instrument soft law would have precluded its success. WIPO thus
correctly chose to make this international instrument a treaty rather than a joint
recommendation.

* Executive Director of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School and Lecturer in Law,
Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School.
- Professor of Law, Ono Academic School of Law, Israel. Visiting Fellow at the Information Society
Project at Yale Law School, 2011-2015. Visiting International Professor, Fordham Law School, 2012,
2014. We would like to thank the Information Society Project at Yale Law School and its fellows, as
well as Michael W. Reisman, Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, and Amichai Cohen for their important
contributions. Any errors are our own.
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This paper explains the international need for this instrument, to solve a
global "book famine" and protect the access rights of visually impaired people. It
then outlines the debate that occurred leading up to adoption over whether the
instrument should be hard law or soft law. This debate illuminates that discussions
of hard versus soft law need to be situated in context. We explore both related
human rights law and other international copyright law to explain how they altered
the hard law-soft law calculation in this case.
The concluded treaty reflects WIPO's recognition of related copyright law
that had been established in other forums. By creating a binding instrument, WIPO
has encouraged developing countries to implement the new treaty, towards the goal
of assisting those visually impaired persons most in need of an international
solution.
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INTRODUCTION

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) at the United Nations
recently confronted a human rights problem of global scale: visually impaired
people face a "book famine" stemming from the inability of persons with print and
other reading disabilities to obtain accessible versions of copyrighted works.' The
World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that there are 285 million people with
print disabilities, and only around five percent of books are available in accessible
formats in developed countries. 2 In developing countries, the percentage of books
that are available in accessible formats is much lower, estimated at less than one
3
percent.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects
freedom of expression, including the "freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds." 4 This right belongs to all persons, whether or
not they are visually impaired. The 2006 United Nation General Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities recognizes the right of people with disabilities

to enjoy equal access to educational, cultural, political, and employment-related
knowledge and materials, in accessible formats.5
Other law, however, places significant hurdles to this access right. In some
countries, making accessible formats for visually impaired persons is considered an
infringement of copyright law. Only 57 countries, representing fewer than half of
WIPO's 184 member states, were identified as having created specific exceptions
and limitations to copyright for the benefit of the visually impaired.6 In other
countries, while making accessible formats might be permitted, cross-border

World Intellectual Property Organization, Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the
Visually Impaired, SCCR/15/7 (Feb. 20, 2007) [hereinafter WIPO Study], available at http://www.wipo
.int/meetings/en/doc-details.jsp?docid=75696.
2 World Health Org., Visual Impairment and Blindness, FACT SHEET N°282 (Oct. 2013), http://www

.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs282/en/index.html [hereinafter WHO Fact Sheet] (estimating 39
million are blind and 246 million have low vision, amongst those about 65% of all people who are
visually impaired are aged 50 and older and 19 million children under 15 are visually impaired).
' Press Release, World Blind Union, On Track for a "Books Without Borders" Treaty (June 30, 2011),
http://www.worldblindunion.org/Engish/our-work/our-priorities/Pages/On-Track-For-A-BookWithout-Borders.aspx.
4International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 30, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter UN Convention].
6 WIPO Study, supranote 1, at 9, 28.
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transfer of these formats is considered to be infringement. Relying on the market to
solve these problems has not worked; the current copyright licensing system for
making written works accessible is inadequate and inefficient. 7 Persons with print
disabilities are consequently denied access to educational materials, literature,
entertainment, and the free flow of ideas that constitute full participation in
society.8
WIPO thus established an international instrument to enable accessibility for
persons with print disabilities by providing specific limitations and exceptions to
copyright.9 Different groups offered several proposed drafts of the instrument, 0
and a Chair's text" was drafted as the "basis for future text-based work."' 2 The
different proposals were united into one draft, which served as the basis for

' WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that the shortage of access to copyrighted works is created by
"difficulties in reaching licensing agreements" for accessible copies, "both regarding activity within a
country and movement of accessible copies across borders").
' UN Convention, supra note 5, art. 30 ("Participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport.
(1) States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to take part on an equal basis with
others in cultural life, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities:
(a) Enjoy access to cultural materials in accessible formats").
' The Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) agreed at its twenty-second session
in June 2011 to recommend to the WIPO General Assembly that Members continue discussion of the
proposed instrument with the aim to "agree and finalize a proposal on an international instrument on
limitations and exceptions for persons with print disabilities in the 23rd session of the SCCR." WIPO,
SCCR, Draft Report, 86 15, WIPO Doc. SCCR/22/18 Prov. (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter SSCR/22/18].
" There were four proposals related to copyright limitations and exceptions and the needs of the visually
impaired and other persons with print disabilities, submitted by the Member States of WIPO and the
European Union. See WIPO, SCCR, ComparativeList of ProposalsRelated to Copyright Limitations
and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired Persons and Other Persons with Print Disabilities, WIPO
Doc. SCCR/22/8 (Mar. 16, 2011) [hereinafter List of Proposals] (preparedby the Secretariat).
" WIPO, SCCR, Revised Working Document on an International Instrument on Limitations and
Exceptions For Visually Impaired Persons/Persons with Print Disabilities, WlPO Doc. SCCR/24/9
(July 26, 2012) (adopted by the Committee as a working draft); WIPO, SCCR, Proposal on an
internationalinstrument on limitations and exceptions for persons with print disabilities,WIPO Doc.
SCCR/22/16 (June 23, 2011) [hereinafter Chair's July 12 Proposal] (preparedby the Chair).
2 SCCR/22/18, supranote 9, at 85 (reporting that "the Committee asked the Chair to prepare a Chair's

text for an international instrument on limitations and exceptions for persons with print disabilities
(document SCCR/22/16), which would constitute the basis for the future text-based work to be
undertaken by the Committee in its 23rd session").
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negotiations by member states in a diplomatic conference. Those negotiations
successfully concluded in adoption of the treaty in June 2013.13
This article addresses a fundamental disagreement that arose over this
instrument during its negotiations: whether the proposed international instrument
should be shaped as a binding treaty (hard law) or as a joint recommendation (soft
law). The U.S. delegation to WIPO's Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights (SCCR) first opposed any deal that would produce an enforceable
treaty and was instead in favor of an informal slate of policy recommendations.' 4
The 2011 U.S. delegation to WIPO's SCCR advocated for a two-step process, in
which the first step will be a joint recommendation, "on the path" to a second step
of binding international standards.15 Later, the U.S. delegation changed its position
and agreed to a treaty, without discussing the intensity or the extent of the binding
clauses.' 6 The European Union followed a similar pattern, initially proposing a

3 Draft Text of an InternationalInstrument/Treatyon Limitations and Exceptionsfor Visually Impaired
Persons/Personswith Print Disabilities,Draft, WIPO Doc. General Assembly, WO/GA/42/2, Twentyfifth Session (Dec. 17-18, 2012), http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc-detailsjsp?docid=223007
[hereinafter General Assembly's Draft]. For more documents about the preparation toward the
Diplomatic Conference, see PreparatoryCommittee of the Diplomatic Conference to conclude a Treaty
to facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print
Disabilities, WIPO Conferences, Meeting and Seminars (Dec. 17-18, 2012), http://www.wipo.int'
meetings/en/details.jsp?meetingid=28442 [hereinafter WIPO Preparatory Committee] ("[T]he WIPO
General Assembly took a landmark decision today to convene a diplomatic conference in 2013 to
complete negotiations on a pact to improve access to copyrighted works for the many visually impaired
and people with print disabilities around the world. The General Assembly also expressed gratitude to
Morocco for its offer to host the diplomatic conference."). WIPO Advances Toward Treaty to Facilitate
Access to Published Works by Persons with Print Disabilities, Morocco Offers to Host Diplomatic
Conference Geneva, WIPO Report, PR/2012/727, WIPO News & Events (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www
.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0026.html [hereinafter WIPO PR/2012/7271.
" Zach Carter, Obama Administration Stalls Blind Rights Treaty for Another Year, HUFF POST
POLITICS, July26, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/26/blind-treaty-2012_n_1706543
.html [hereinafter Obama Administration] ("The U.S. and European blockade is supported by large
publishing companies; developing nations and advocates for people living with disabilities object.").
'5

SCCR/22/18, supra note 9, at 22-23.

16Justin Hughes, Senior Advisor to the Under Sec 'y of Commercefor IntellectualProp., US. Statement
at the WIPO General Assembly (Dec. 17, 2012), http://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/12/17/wipo/
(explaining that the US was always in favor of promoting access to print materials for visually impaired
persons and the US believes that the recommendation would have a better and faster effect because
many countries follow Berne Convention recommendations, compared to the long process of ratification
followed by a binding treaty).
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joint recommendation and finally voting for negotiating a binding treaty. 17 By
contrast, other delegations, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Mexico, and the African Group, always insisted the agreement should be a binding
hard-law treaty.' 8
This article addresses this debate between WIPO member states, identifying
the differences between employing a soft-law joint recommendation and a hard-law
treaty in this policy space. We situate our discussions of hard and soft law against
the existing landscapes of both international copyright law and international human
rights law. By now, several other scholars have addressed this question, coming to
19
varying conclusions and referring to an earlier draft of this article.
Our conclusion, based on the interaction between international intellectual
property law and human rights law, is that WIPO correctly decided that the
instrument should be constructed as a binding treaty, hard law, rather than a nonbinding joint recommendation, soft law. First, non-binding recommendations can
become "dead letter" law-law that is signed but never actually complied with.
The global problem of the book famine is too important for the solution to be
reduced to an ineffective international statement of policy. Second, soft law is a
less appropriate solution where negotiators already share a policy consensus to a
great degree of specificity, rather than vague aspirations that might require
experimentation. Third, soft law can be inefficient and incur unnecessary costs for
countries. Fourth, a hard-law human rights treaty already exists in this space, but
has not been implemented. Thus a soft-law instrument would not operate the way
such instruments have been used by WIPO in the past. Fifth, a hard instrument
would promote national legislation in developing countries. Sixth, in the copyright
context, the international field is crowded with multiple hard-law agreements in

"7Id. at 25. James Love, KEI Statement on WIPO decision to hold June 2013 diplomatic conference for
treaty on copyright exceptionsfor disabilities,KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://keionline.org/node/163 1.
mId. at 24-25; SCCR/22/18, supra note 9.
'9

Aaron Scheinwald, Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the Blind?, 22 FORDHAM INTELL.

PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 445, 507-08 (2012) (concluding that reaching a consensus is the important

factor, where the binding document reflects a high level of consensus); Silke von Lewinski, WIPO's
Discussion on Exceptions and Limitations in Particularin Favor of Visually Impaired Persons, 53
REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AUEUR [R.ID.C.] 71, 163-65 (2010) (Fr.) (available in French,
German and English) (opposing the solution of binding international treaty and suggests that solutions
may be found at national level for those who desire).
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different forums, preventing the experimentation and norm-setting that soft law
ordinarily can provide.
It is our conclusion that choosing soft law here would have constituted a
functional withdrawal from the goal of creating international exceptions and
limitations to copyright laws for blind people and people with print disabilities. We
therefore applaud WIPO for choosing binding hard law as the more appropriate
instrument toward the goal of establishing compliance with limitations and
exceptions, benefitting the world's visually impaired population. At this stage,
countries have signed the treaty, but should soon ratify it and begin making the
necessary adjustments in their national laws.

II. BACKGROUND ON THE INSTRUMENT THROUGH ITS
PROPOSAL STAGES
This section is intended as an introduction to the history of the treaty and the
reasons for its existence. We briefly sketch international copyright law, and the
general justifications for limitations and exceptions to copyright. We then identify
the specific problem the instrument seeks to solve: the lack of access to
copyrighted works by persons with print disabilities. This section concludes by
briefly summarizing arguments for how the instrument fits into existing
international copyright law.
A.

InternationalCopyright Law and Limitations andExceptions

The international framework for copyright protection exists in many different
forums, from WIPO to the World Trade Organization (WTO) to individual bilateral
agreements to plurilateral agreements like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA). 20 International instruments addressing copyright were
designed to promote harmonization among countries by establishing uniform ways
of protecting the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works. International
treaties that address copyright law include the Berne Convention for The Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"), the WIPO Copyright Treaty
(WCT), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), and the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at the
WTO. 1 International copyright laws grant the owners of certain non-tangible

20 See Margot

E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade

Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TECH. 385 (2011).
21 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris

on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)

[hereinafter Beme

Convention]; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996 [hereinafter WCT]; and the WIPO Performances
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works exclusive rights for a limited time. 22 International requirements include, for
example, a minimum level of copyright protection, and rules against discrimination
23
between copyrighted goods based on national origin.
International regulation was inspired in part by the ease of transferring
copyrighted works across borders. International intellectual property agreements
thus often address and regulate the issue of cross-border movement of copyright
works.24 International copyright law emphasizes protecting the control of copyright
owners (also referred to as rights holders) and their right to exclude others from
their works.
Different states justify copyright law under different theories. In the United
States, for example, copyright has a utilitarian justification: it is meant to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."25 French and German copyright laws, by
contrast, treat copyrighted works as an extension of the personality of the author or
the fruits of the author's expression of his or her body and soul. 26 Some have found
distributive justice justifications for copyright, as well.27 International copyright
law attempts to reconcile these multiple theories, and scholars have observed that

and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO [hereinafter WPPT]. Also see International Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 12,
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention] and Convention for the Protection of Producers
of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 27, 1971, both addressing
copyrights of phonograms, which might be relevant for people with print disabilities. The above
Conventions are available at the WIPO site: http://www.visionip.org/vipresources/en/treaties.html. The
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS], availableat http://www.wto
.org/englishtratope/tripse/tagmOe.htm.
22See, e.g., Berne Convention, supranote 21, at art. 1; WCT, arts. 2, 4-9; TRIPS, arts. 9-12.
23Berne Convention, supra note 21, at arts. 5(1), 5(3), 19.

24von Lewinski, supra note 19, at 145-49 (available in French and English); Berne Convention, supra
note 21, at art. 16; WCT, supra note 21, at art. 6.
25U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
26Justin Hughes, The PersonalityInterest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOzO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998).
27See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 'from Below": Copyright and Capabilityfor Education, 40

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805 (2007).
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the language of international agreements shows that international copyright law is
28
motivated at least by both natural law and utilitarian considerations.
There is a natural tension in copyright, under any theory, between the rights
of authors and the rights of users of their work-including second-generation
authors and innovators. It can be challenging to achieve an appropriate balance
between the authors of today and the authors of tomorrow. 9 But most copyright
law tries to strike a balance so that there is "enough and as good left in common for
others" to create their own work in the future. 30 For example,. when an author
resituates a fairytale in a modem setting, we can choose to recognize that the trope
has become part of a cultural commons over time, and allow the new author to
express herself unhindered by copyright licensing.
Under a property right accountability theory, copyright limitations arise
because the owner has a responsibility to other individuals and communities during
the exploitation of those rights. Governments impose certain limitations and
exceptions on the ownership regime to ensure systemic accountability to nonowners.

31

A different kind of tension arises from the utilitarian (U.S.) perspective. From
this perspective, the benefits to copyright owners must be balanced against the
good for society as a whole. Copyright should be limited in order to avoid
squelching more creative production than it incentivizes. At least theoretically,
utilitarian motives allow for more open-ended provisions of limitations, such as fair
use or fair dealing, because government regulators consider the interests of society
32
as a whole, rather than prioritizing the rights of individual owners.

28 MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE

THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 17 (2004).
29Id. at 38-39. See also WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 12 ("Creators in general are not working in a
vacuum. Rather they are often building on, or being inspired by, earlier creativity .... Users and
creators arc therefore not necessarily distinct groups having different needs and many people will at
certain times be users and at other times be creators.").
30

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

15 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1690).
31See generally Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001)

(discussing the accountability of a property owner).
32See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Pierre N. Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-36 (1990).
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The tension in copyright between the divergent interests of authors and users
is the foundation of limitations and exceptions to copyright laws.33 On an
international level, limitations and exceptions are preserved in the "three-step test"
articulated in the following international intellectual' property agreements: Article
9(2) of the Berne Convention, Article 13 of TRIPS, Article 10 of the WCT, and
Article 16(2) of the WPPT.34
The three-step test is an abstract formula that permits unauthorized
reproductions of copyrighted works "in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."35 The three-step test
on limitations and exceptions was formulated to allow countries to create or
preserve their own domestic systems for limitations and exceptions, which
substantially differ from country to country.3 6 Countries' systems for limitations
and exceptions must fit within the three-step test.37 However, no intemational
instrument dictates which particular limitations and exceptions a country must
minimally adopt. The United States has adopted "fair use" as its version of
exceptions and limitations.38 Some scholars claim fair use to be substantially
39
broader than the three-step test.

33SENFTLEBEN, supra note 28, at 2-3.
3'Berne Convention, supra note 21, at art. 9(2); TRIPS, supranote 21, at art. 13; WPPT, supra note 23,

at art. 16(2).
3'Berne Convention, supranote 21, at art. 9(2).
supra note 28, at I ("A country's specific system of limitations, in general, seems to be
a sacrosanct feature of domestic copyright laws ....
");
see also WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 12 ("The
nature and scope of exceptions and limitations to rights has been largely left to national policy makers to
determine within broad permissive areas.").
36 SENFTLEBEN,

37 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DSI60/R

(June 15, 2000) (discussing the European Communities' determination that Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, which permits, under certain conditions, playing radio and television music in public
places without a royalty, did not comply with the Berne Convention, and that the WTO panel found that
while one section did fall into the three-step test, the other did not and was in violation of U.S.
obligations under the Berne Convention).
"817 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
39See,

e.g., Ruth Okediji, TowardanInternationalFair Use Doctrine, 39 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75
(2000); Jacob Zweig, Fair Use as Free Speech Fundamental: How Copyright Law Creates a Conflict
Between InternationalIntellectual Propertyand Human Rights Treaties, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1550 (2013).
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The Problem: The Market Isn't Working andExisting
Exceptions Are Inadequate

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 285 million people are
visually impaired worldwide: 39 million are blind, and 246 million have low
vision.4" Again, in developed countries, fewer than five percent of published books
are currently available in formats useable by visually impaired people. 41 This
number is even lower in developing countries, which shows a critical problem,
since ninety percent of visually impaired persons live in countries of low or
moderate incomes. 42 These figures point to market failure in offering accessible
works for people with print disabilities.43
The world today is going through rapid technological developments. In a
knowlcdge-based world, access to copyrighted works has become more and more
important to everyday life, and improves overall welfare. Thus, the accessibility of
print works has become an essential component of full participation in society.'
The 2006 United Nation General Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Disabilities Convention) recognizes the right of people with
disabilities to enjoy access to educational, cultural, political, and employmentrelated knowledge and materials in accessible formats. 45 To ensure access to
knowledge for the millions of people with print disabilities, governments have to
address copyright laws.
There are two core copyright-related obstacles to access for the visually
impaired. The WIPO Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the
Visually Impaired 46 notes that the shortage of access to copyrighted works is
created by difficulties in reaching licensing agreements for accessible copies, for
both activity within a country and the movement of copies across borders.47 Many

40 WHO Fact Sheet, supra note

2, at 1.

4' WIPO Study, supranote 1, at 14.
42List of Proposals,supranote 10, at 3.

41Scheinwald, supranote 19, at 495, 511.
" See generally Jack Balkin, What is Access to Knowledge?, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 21, 2006, 7:05 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-access-to-knowledge.html.
41UN Convention, supra note 5.
4 WIPO Study, supra note 1.
47

Id. at 10.
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visually impaired persons live in developing countries, while many of the
copyrighted works they wish to access are produced in developed countries.
Addressing the cross-border movement of information is critical.
Visually impaired persons cannot read print materials directly. Instead, they
use transformed formats based on the original print work. Such formats include
Braille, "talking books," and audio formats created by software that converts print
materials into audio (the most popular are the open-source DAISY CD Digital
Accessible Information Sys. and DAISY TEXT/AUDIO).48 Transferring a work
into different formats, however, may be considered an infringement of the
copyright owner's derivative work rights.4' For example, copyright owners
frequently license audio editions of their books to specific publishers, so an
unauthorized audio version is likely to be considered an infringement.
To avoid copyright infringement, a company seeking to make a given work
accessible could choose to obtain a copyright license to reproduce that work in a
specific format. Licensing costs, however, can be high, especially if the licensee's
goal is not to promote a particular book but to make as many books accessible as
possible. In a working market, this is less of a problem; a publisher could at least
hypothetically recoup the licensing costs of an audio book through sales of that
book. However, because so many visually impaired people live in developing
countries that speak languages other than English, the licensing and distribution
costs are often prohibitively high from the perspective of a for-profit publisher. A
rational for-profit publisher might not choose, for example, to enter the Hindi
market for audio books.
Most conversions of published books into accessible formats are typically
undertaken by nonprofit organizations, which survive on limited funding from
charities and government support. For those not-for-profits that do not expect to
recoup costs, copyright licensing only adds to the already high cost of accessible
formats. It is costly to convert works to Braille, or scan them in the right format for
specific software. It is costly to pay somebody to read and record written materials,
and then have those materials translated and distributed. 50 In a not-for-profit

'8 See von Lewinski, supranote 19, at 127-41 (discussing a survey and the different tools).
49 Berne Convention, supra note 21, at arts. 2(6), 5(1), 8-9 (describing the exclusive rights of the

authors); WCT supranote 21, at art. 6.
50See von Lewinski, supra note 19, at 127-41 (explaining for example that DISY open source software

operates on XML format, whereas most works are on PDF and need scanning); see also Scheinwald,
supra note 19, at 482 (noting that the cost equivalent of a Braille Harry Potter series in Australia to its
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market, the addition of a copyright licensing fee to these already significant costs
imposes a substantial burden on those companies that provide accessible works,
51
and the visually impaired people who desire access.
In light of market failure, one can expect governments to intervene in this
space by creating a copyright exception for the visually impaired. However, many
countries have not adopted copyright exceptions for visually impaired people. At
the time of the WIPO Study, significantly fewer than half of WIPO Member States
had laws relating specifically to the needs of visually impaired people.5 2 Some
fifty-seven countries, however, do have specific provisions that permit assisting
visually impaired people by making a copyright work available in an accessible
form.53 Such countries include traditionally more powerful WIPO negotiators such
as Australia, Canada, the United States, France, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and
Japan. 4 In six countries, exceptions are limited to Braille copies,55 which is not the
main tool used by visually impaired people.56 Nineteen countries limit exceptions
to the production of Braille or other specialized formats, 57 while twenty-one
countries do not limit the format.5 The remaining eleven countries have other
variations on the types of accessible formats possible; for example, Norway permits
59
all formats except for sound.
The second problem created by copyright law concerns the cross-border
transfer of accessible products. This is a crucial point, since the production of
accessible formats is so costly and time consuming. The inter-institutional and
cross-border exchange of existing formatted copies avoids duplication of both
effort and costs. As discussed, in a number of countries, making an accessible

300,000 people who suffer from correctable visual impairment would cost the government $133
million).
" Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Visually Impaired Persons and Copyright, 41 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 377 (2010).
52WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 28.
53

54

Id. at 9.

Id. at30.

55Id. at 36.
56Loon, supranote 51, at 378.
" WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 38.

58Id. at 36.
59

Id. at 39.
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format is permissible through an exception to copyright law.60 But the importation
of accessible copies from other countries may be forbidden, through national law or
international treaties.61 In these countries, organizations seeking to increase access
to copyrighted works will have to remake their products within their borders,
duplicating previously invested efforts and cost. The ban on the importation of
accessible works made in other countries also prevents more efficient solutions,
such as online delivery. In the absence of harmonization among countries, existing
law raises hurdles for cross-border product exchange.62 Thus, many countries
cannot produce accessible copies or cannot import these copies from an existing
63
global library.
The UN Convention regarding the general rights of people with disabilities
appears to directly address these problems. However, its existence and ratification
have not significantly changed the actual on-the-ground ability of persons with
print disabilities to access copyrighted works. 64
Article 30 of the UN Convention obliges Member States to take appropriate
measures to ensure that copyright law does not constitute an unreasonable or
65
discriminatory barrier to access to cultural materials for persons with disabilities.

60

Id. at 378 ("Making Braille format is governed by compulsory licensing scheme in Singapore whereas

in Hong Kong may fall within an exception in Hong Kong's copyright law, although both former British
colonies, have the same legal tradition and they are comparable in terms of economic development. In
other words, the same act of reproduction which is permitted in Singapore with payment of an equitable
remuneration to the copyright owners can be undertaken in Hong Kong free of any payment.").
61 Id. at 378 ("It is possible to import such copies into Hong Kong, but not into Singapore. In

Singapore's copyright law, there is in fact an explicit prohibition on importing articles made under
compulsory license. This exclusion is explained on the basis that, whilst these articles are legitimate
copies in the country of manufacture, they were not produced with the voluntary consent of the
copyright owner. In this sense, they are not considered genuine products produced by or with the
consent of the copyright owners and hence the doctrine of exhaustion should not apply.").
62See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 21, at art. 16 ("Infringing Copies ...(1) Infringing copies of

a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection.
(2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country
where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected.") (emphasis added); WCT, supra note
21, art. 6 ("Right of Distribution").
63Loon, supranote 51, at 378-79 (giving Singapore and Hong-Kong as examples).

UN Convention, supra note 5.
65

Id. at art. 30 ("Participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport (1) States Parties recognize

the right of persons with disabilities to take part on an equal basis with others in cultural life, and shall
take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities: (a) Enjoy access to cultural
materials in accessible formats; ...(3) States Parties shall take all appropriate steps, in accordance with
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Article 30, however, uses general terms and states a principle-that intellectual
property should not unreasonably or discriminatorily impede access to cultural
materials in accessible formats-rather than proposing a specific mechanism.
Many of WIPO's member states have not complied with this general
obligation, notwithstanding ratification of the treaty. The WIPO Study pointed out
in 2007 that "international agreements relevant to the rights of disabled people may
already require countries to take the needs of disabled people into account when
framing their copyright laws."66 In practice, however, most countries did not make
such accommodations. Thus, WIPO's members were justified in seeking to create a
new, more specific international instrument to establish international legal
standards on both copyright exceptions and the cross-border exchange of special
format copies.
C.

The Placefor Such an Instrument Within the Three-step Test

Until now, nothing in international law has specifically provided for
exceptions to copyright for the benefit of visually impaired people.67 This
exception is not, however, a new or outlandish concept for many countries. Not
only did many countries already have such an exception, but discussion of this
exception arose during earlier international copyright lawmaking.
The study group that undertook the preparatory work for the 1967 Stockholm
Revision Conference at which the three-step test was established surveyed existing
limitations, and created a list of the fourteen most frequent limitations. These
included "(9) reproduction in special characters for the use of the blind" and "(10)
sound recordings of literary works for the use of the blind., 68 Exceptions for the
blind have thus widely existed across countries since before international copyright
law was deeply harmonized in the latter half of the twentieth century.
The negotiators of international copyright law may, in fact, have explicitly
contemplated that the three-step test would cover an exception for the visually
impaired. The 1967 study group presented a preliminary draft of limitations and

international law, to ensure that laws protecting intellectual property rights do not constitute an
unreasonable, or discriminatory barrier to access by persons with disabilities to cultural materials.").
66WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 11.
67

Id.at 17.

supra note 28, at 48 (citing to Doc. S/I, Records 1967, 112 n.l,
and pointing out that
enumerated limitations I to 6 were provided for in the earlier 1948 Brussels Act).
68 SENFTLEBEN,
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exceptions that allowed exceptions "for specified purposes,"69 including "the
interests of the blind. '70 The final version of the three-step test similarly
contemplates exceptions "in certain special cases," and one might presume, given
the widespread nature of the exception in countries at the time and recognition of it
in the drafting process, that the interests of persons with print disabilities would
constitute a special case.
While the three-step test may have been intended to allow copyright
exceptions for access by persons with print disabilities, in practice its vagueness
leaves many countries confused, so they do not adopt such exceptions. Delivering
accessibility for visually impaired people may be justified under current
international exceptions,71 but the framework of exceptions in international treaties
and conventions related to copyright "is complex and confusing for those drawing
72
up exceptions to rights for the benefit of visually impaired people.
The WIPO Study concluded that because of the uncertainty costs inherent in a
broader copyright exception like the three-step test, the only comprehensive
solution would be to outline exceptions that specifically provide for the needs of
73
the blind or other visually impaired people.

D.

The Marrakesh Treaty

The treaty adopted at the Marrakesh Conference attempts to address the above
problems. 74 Its negotiation, however, was beset for several years by a key
controversy. At the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Session of the Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SSCR) at WIPO, the Committee
recognized "the aim to agree and finalize a proposal on an international instrument

69Id. at 50 (citing to Doc. S/1, Records 1967, 112) (countries may "limit the recognition and exercising

of that right, for specified purposes and on the condition that these purposes should not enter into
economic competition with these works").
70

Id.

71WIPO Study, supra note 1, at 11.
71Id. at 134.
73Id. at 29 (observing that it is "extremely unlikely that exceptions that do not specifically provide for
the needs of blind or other visually impaired people would provide a comprehensive solution to the
needs of those facing a print disability").
74 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013, VIP/DC/8 REV. [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty],
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/diplconf/en/vipdc/cipdc_8.pdf.
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on limitations and exceptions for persons with print disabilities." 75 While states
agreed on the goal of enabling and facilitating access to knowledge for people with
print disabilities, they could not overcome the hurdle of whether the instrument
should be soft law or hard law. 76 We argue that the eventual decision that the
instrument would be hard law was the correct choice.

III. THE FEATURES OF HARD LAW AND SOFT LAW
WIPO's negotiating countries remained split for a long time over what kind of
instrument the treaty for the blind would be: hard law or soft law. International
instruments can contain different levels of hardness and softness. They can be more
or less binding, and more or less specific in their provisions. In the intellectual
property regime, WIPO's historical approach has been to favor treaties and
conventions, which are characterized by more binding features. Nevertheless, some
years ago, WIPO adopted a series of softer non-treaty "Joint Recommendations,"
77
mainly in the area of trademark law.
The instrument at issue could have been pursued either as a recommendation
(soft law) or as a binding treaty (hard law). Each would have created different
opportunities and obligations. In this section, we present the features of soft law
and hard law that the negotiators had to weigh. We argue that those who proposed a
soft-law recommendation failed to consider the broader contexts in which the
instrument would be made.
WIPO's Marrakesh Diplomatic Conference made the correct decision in
choosing to pursue a treaty instead of a joint recommendation. Once the countries,
the WIPO's professional committee, and WIPO's General Assembly all asserted
the goal of creating an international instrument on copyright limitations and
exceptions for persons with print disabilities, the remaining question was how hard
or soft the features of this instrument should be.

7 SCCR/22/18, supra note 9, at 86.
76See infra note 11; SCCR/22/1 8, supra note 9, at pmbl.

7 Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc.
833(E) (Sept. 20, 1999-Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Well-Known Marks Recommendation], availableat
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/development-iplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf;
Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property
Rights in Signs, on the Interet, WIPO Doc. 845(E) (Sept. 24, 2001-Oct. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Internet
Marks Recommendation], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/development
_iplaw/pdflpub845.pdf.
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Definitions

The mechanisms of international agreements vary along a spectrum, from
hard to soft. Abbott and Snidal define this spectrum along three dimensions: (i) the
precision of the rules; (ii) the level of obligation; and (iii) whether there is
delegation to a third-party decision-maker.7 8 "Hard" agreements bind parties to
precise rules, and are often enforced by a third party. Hard agreements can require
parties to implement new laws in order to bring domestic law into compliance;
otherwise, states may face an enforcement mechanism.
Similarly, Michael W. Reisman describes all lawmaking as the
communication of three elements: content, signals of authority, and
communications of intent to make the law effective.79 Law may be harder or softer
along these dimensions. A given law may contain precise content, but exist amidst
other signals that the enactors have no intention of making the law effective. Or it
may appear effective, but state a generalized, less enforceable principle rather than
precise content. For example, in the case of complex environmental treaties, states
concerned with enforcement have created binding hard-law agreements with
vaguer, shallower terms that are readily complied with, but are ineffective as
80
regards behavioral change.
It is thus worth recognizing that even a binding agreement may be softer or
harder based on content, so how "hard" the agreement ultimately is depends on the
rules it contains, in addition to their enforceability or implementation requirements.

B.

HardLaw

Hard law presents a number of benefits, many of which ensure local
compliance.

78 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401 (2000). This is

substantively similar to Kal Raustiala's consideration of (i) the substance of the agreement; (ii) the form
of the agreement; and (iii) the structure for review of performance. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 552 (Thomas Risse & Beth Simmons eds., 2002).

79 Michael W. Reisman, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 373, 374 (1988),
availableat http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss papers/750.
80 Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B.
Skolnikoff eds., 1998).
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Legal positivists perceive binding hard law treaties as real legal obligations,
and judge soft law instruments as failed treaties. 81 This may be a simplified view,
but it is based on accurate observations: binding hard law does usually carry both
enforcement requirements and a norm of compliance. Normatively, hard
instruments have the stamp and aura of law, like domestic law, and states are
arguably more concerned with the reputational consequences of failing to comply
82
with binding hard law.
Practically, a binding instrument usually requires implementation and
enforcement, where a soft instrument usually does not. Domestic systems must be
brought into compliance with binding hard law. Domestic implementation,
however, has larger compliance ramifications than merely telling domestic actors
what they must do. Implementation also mobilizes domestic actors. 83 Giving
international backing to domestic actors can cause shifts in the negotiating
strengths of domestic constituents that "can in turn shift the compliance preferences
of governments." 84 Thus, hard law not only requires states to implement; it also
empowers those domestic actors benefited by the new law to ensure that states are
complying locally.
In sum, the benefit of binding hard law is both normative and structural.
Normatively, states may be more likely to comply because the international norm is
to comply with hard law. Structurally, states are usually required to implement hard
law, and this not only brings domestic law into compliance with hard law, it also
increases the number of actors encouraging states to comply by expanding
incentives to domestic actors.
C.

Soft Law

Of course, international hard law also faces many challenges. Many scholars
have convincingly argued that international soft law agreements are not merely
"failed treaties," but can in fact often be a superior institutional choice. For
example, Abott and Snidal claim that even though soft law may be less credible

"jGeorge C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hardvs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements andAntagonists
in InternationalGovernance, 94 MINN. L. REv. 706, 707 (2010).
2 Andrew Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579, 583 (2005); cf

George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and InternationalLaw, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S95, S108-09 (2002) (examining the development of segmented reputations).
s Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 81, at 718.
4Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 78, at 547.
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than hard law, states often choose soft law as a "superior institutional arrangement"
based on a number of different factors, including transaction costs, uncertainty,
implications for national sovereignty, divergence of preferences, and power
85
differentials between negotiating countries.
The identified benefits of soft law are roughly as follows: soft law instruments
can be less costly to negotiate. They can impose lower sovereignty costs on states,
and greater flexibility for states to cope with uncertainty or diversity of views. They
can also allow states to arrive at a "deeper" set of rules, since there is less worry
86
about enforcement consequences in the implementation process.
Additionally, soft law can be conceived of as a necessary step on the way to
hard law, during which states may alter their interests or norms through
experimentation.87 Eventually, agreement on harder rules becomes possible.
88
Rushing to hard law too soon may cause an instrument to soften in other ways.
Finally, soft law can be employed where a hard law instrument already
exists. 89 Soft law in this circumstance fills in the gaps in a hard law instrument,
creating interpretive norms for use by states and interstate enforcement
mechanisms such as the WTO dispute resolution system.
D.

The RelationshipBetween Hardand Soft Law

The traditional understanding of the relationship between soft and hard law is
that soft law may lead to hard law, or complement it by filling in interpretive gaps
in existing hard law. Even from this understanding, we believe hard law is the
better option for this instrument, for reasons outlined in the next section.
But we also believe that the traditional understanding is, in this case,
incorrect. The conceptualization of soft law as filling gaps in hard law or
complementing it fails to take into account the role of the full landscape of existing

85 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidel, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L

ORG. 421,423 (2000).
86Shaffer & Pollack, supranote 81, at 719.
8' See Stephen J. Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and InternationalLaw, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

98 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
8' Raustiala & Victor, supra note 80 (suggesting that in the case of environmental treaties, states create
binding hard law with shallower terms that are ineffective at instigating behavioral change).
89Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 81, at 722.
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laws. In this case, international copyright law developed outside of WIPO is
binding, specific, and enforceable through trade measures. This external law
constricts what states may do, leaving no real gap for soft law to fill. The context of
existing multilateral and bilateral agreements on intellectual property leads us to
conclude that binding law is the only way in which this particular instrument could
be effective and cause compliance on the ground.
Scholarship on hard and soft law tends to assume that countries start from a
clean slate. We believe that scholars and negotiating countries must observe and
acknowledge the broader legal landscape before discussing the benefits of hard
versus soft law.
IV. HARD LAW Is BETTER IN THis CASE
In this section, we compare the benefits of hard and soft law for this particular
instrument. We begin by examining the Joint Recommendations WIPO has used
recently. Then we discuss why some countries preferred a joint recommendation.
We argue, however, that hard law was the better choice for a number of reasons: it
is less likely to create "dead letter"; the instrument is the result of consensus, not
aspirations; and soft law will be inefficient, where the problem WIPO set out to
address is in large part one of inefficiency. We also claim that hard law may help
developing countries to implement new legislation or amendments to existing
legislation that they cannot otherwise achieve.
In this specific case, two additional perspectives must be considered: the
human rights perspective and the international copyright perspective. From the
human rights perspective, hard law already exists, but has not been implemented
domestically, so a Joint Recommendation would not aid in domestic interpretation
of the law. From the international copyright perspective, existing hard-law
agreements do not leave adequate room for soft-law experimentation. Thus we
conclude, given these two added perspectives, that WIPO was correct when it
decided that the instrument should be hard law.
A.

What Are the Joint Recommendations?

Several member states suggested that WIPO use a Joint Recommendation to
90
address the issue of access to copyrighted works by people with print disabilities.
In the intellectual property regime there are at least three international instruments
embodied as "Joint Recommendations" by WIPO. The first is the Joint

90SSCR/22/18, supranote 9, at 9, 18, 22; Obama Administration,supranote 14.
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Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks
("Well-Known Marks Recommendation"). 9
The second is the Joint
Recommendation
Concerning
Trademark
Licenses
("Trademark
Recommendation"). 92 The third is the Joint Recommendation Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in
Signs, on the Internet ("Internet Marks Recommendation").93
A Joint Recommendation, within the WIPO context, has distinct
characteristics. First, it is not intended to be a binding tool, nor it is capable of
being formally ratified by the countries. Each Member State may consider the use
of the provisions as guidelines rather than requirements. 94 Second,
Recommendations are experimental in nature, and are envisioned as potentially
eventually leading to hard law.95 Third, the existing Recommendations are all
based on existing hard law treaties or conventions, which were domestically
96
implemented by the member countries.

" Well-Known Marks Recommendation, supra note 77.
92 Joint Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses, WIPO Doc. 835 (Sept. 25, 2000-Oct. 3,

2000) [hereinafter Trademark Recommendation],
development iplaw/pdf/pub835.pdf.

available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/

93 Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial
Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, WIPO Doc. 845(E) (Sept. 24, 2001-Oct. 3, 2001) [hereinafter
Internet Marks Recommendation], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/
development iplaw/pdf/pub845.pdf.
4 Well-Known Marks Recommendation, supra note 77, at 4. See also Internet Marks Recommendation,
supra note 77, at 2 ("The determination of the applicable law itself is not addressed by the present
provisions, but left to the private international laws of individual Member States.").
" For example, the Well-Known Marks Recommendation, supra note 77, at 2, explains that the future
program is to have a binding treaty on the subject. It is interesting to note that the Internet Marks
Recommendation, supra note 77, is drafted as a detailed law, including even provisions regarding
liability and remedies.
96All three recommendations are based on the provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of

Industrial Property. Well-Known Marks Recommendation, supra note 77, at 4; Trademark
Recommendation, supra note 92, at 4; Internet Marks Recommendation, supra note 77, at 4. The
Trademark Recommendation, supra note 92, at 2, also relies on Trademark Law Treaty (TLT), as stated
in its preface:
The Joint Recommendation aims at harmonizing and simplifying the formal
requirements for the recordal of trademark licenses and therefore
supplements the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) of October 27, 1994, which is
designed to streamline and harmonize formal requirements set by national or
regional Offices for the filing of national or regional trademark applications,
the recordal of changes, and the renewal of trademark registrations.
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It is also worth looking to the subject matter of the existing joint

recommendations, because international trademark law is different from
international human rights law and international copyright law. The main goal of
the Joint Recommendations has been to suggest a solution when an interpretive gap
exists in implemented trademark law. In other words, Joint Recommendations have
helped countries interpret gaps in implemented provisions by indicating WIPO's
intent about what the original agreement on trademarks means. These three WIPO
Joint Recommendations accompany three trademark hard law instruments, which
have been widely implemented through national laws. 97 Some countries have
adopted the Recommendations into their legal systems, 9 8 and some countries still
choose to ignore them.

99

91 The Madrid Protocol, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as well as the
Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) are considered hard law treaties, and have been widely implemented.
9'Given the non-binding nature of the Joint Recommendations, WIPO has not been able to establish an
exhaustive list of countries or regional systems implementing these instruments. At the national level,
the following could be mentioned as examples of texts implementing totally or partially the WellKnown Marks Recommendation. See for example: the pertinent provisions in the Trademark laws of:
China, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Singapore, and
the Russian Federation and partially in the United States, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002).
Elements of the Internet Marks Recommendation, supra note 77, have been referred to in several
pertinent court decisions. See 1-800-Flowers Inc. v. Phonenames Ltd., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 721, (U.K.);
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Mar. 28, 2003,
RG01/19552 (Fr.) (reporting on the case of S.A. Produits Nestld v. Soci~t6 Mars Inc.);
Bundesgerichtshofs [BGR] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 3, 2004, available at http://juris
.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-binlrechtsprechung/document.pyGericht-bgh&Art=-en&sid=7e7dddcI 10b43
f00clb85559cc4dfa2e&nr-31708&pos=9&anz=22 (reporting on the case of Re: the MARITIM Trade
Mark).
Aside from national laws and court decisions, a number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
between WIPO member States have also incorporated the Joint Recommendation on Well-known
Marks. Examples of these are the following: US-Singapore FTA; US-Jordan FTA; and US-Chile FTA.
States parties to these FTAs undertake to give effect to the said Joint Recommendation.
These are examples of implementations, but it should be noted that WIPO does not indicate a
trend or pattern in terms of the adoption or the extent of implementation of these Joint
Recommendations in WIPO Member States. However, it could in the future undertake such a survey if
the Member States provide it with such a mandate. We thank Ms. Martha Friedli, Head of Trademark
Law Section, WIPO, Geneva, for the clarification of this point.
" U.S. courts, for example, did not follow the joint recommendations. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini,
Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 859 (N.Y. 2007) (not implementing the "famous marks" doctrine, as it was not
incorporated into law by Congress).
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In this case, unlike in the case of trademark law, there is no hard standard for
copyright limitations and exceptions. Instead, there is a need for a new legal
mechanism in the majority of countries, particularly developing countries. Many
countries have not implemented Article 30 of the UN Convention, or fully
exploited the potential of limitations and exceptions from international
copyright.' Thus, to promote copyright accessibility, WIPO needs to craft a basis
for the exception through hard law, and not just make complementary soft
suggestions to existing domestic law. Moreover, WIPO was not the institutional
author of the UN Convention. From this perspective, hard law and not a soft law is
the appropriate tool.
B.

Why Some CountriesFavoreda JointRecommendation

Some countries originally viewed a soft-law joint recommendation as the
better choice of instrument.' 0' These countries likely perceived a recommendation
as the best path to win broad support, the easiest way to avoid conflicts, and the
fastest way to solve deadlocks. A recommendation, because of its non-binding
nature, might be seen as an easier way to achieve consensus and complete an
02
international agreement. 1
From the perspective of countries negotiating at WIPO, the question looked
roughly like this: for this particular instrument, were the transaction costs,
uncertainty, divergence of preferences, and power differentials low enough to bring
this easily to a binding treaty? The answer in any international forum is almost
always no. Then the question becomes: is there any urgency to the issue, or can
negotiating countries calculate that experimentation through soft law makes more
sense for now in developing norms that can more easily be agreed on later? Would
rushing to a binding treaty be likely to alienate participating negotiators, or alter the
terms within the instrument to make it ultimately less effective?
Other sources have cursorily addressed this question. The WIPO Study
envisioned a model of soft law guidance eventually leading to binding hard law in
the long term, offering the cautious recommendation that WIPO could "facilitate

'0' CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL

POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 91 (2008).
101See Obama Administration,supranote 14. See Cameron Russel, The Treatyfor the Visually Impaired
andPrint Disabled-A Trojan Horsefor Copyleft?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTERNATIONAL AND

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid ed., forthcoming 2015), for an interesting
discussion on the hidden motives underlining the negotiation.
102von Lewinski, supra note 19, at 85-91 (opposing binding treaty as taking a lot of time and efforts).
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further discussion about copyright and the rights of disabled people as well as
developing its draft model law for developing countries in the light of the
recommendations in this Study."1 °3 However, the WIPO Study also noted that in
the realm of the confusing international framework of limitations and exceptions,
further debate in the form of hard law is "desirable on this issue in the long
term."I4
Similarly, in discussing the possibility of a more general international
instrument on limitations and exceptions, P. Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth L Okediji
concluded that a soft-law approach would be at least initially preferable. They
reason that soft-law mechanisms are common in international economic regulation,
and that soft law is generally easier to negotiate and adapt to future circumstances.
They point out that soft law may eventually lead to a hard-law global framework.10 5
Here, however, the instrument was not a general instrument on copyright
limitations and exceptions, but addressed the "needs of discrete, vulnerable
members of society, such as those who are visually impaired."'0 6 The fact that the
instrument addresses a specific, relatively narrow problem means there is less need
for experimentation in policy approaches than in the general instrument
contemplated by Hugenholtz and Okediji.l°7
Silke von Lewinski, by contrast, offers a case against this treaty in
particular.0 8 First, von Lewinski claims that a binding copyright exceptions and
limitations treaty will not be an efficient tool because it does not enable the
flexibility countries need for different legal systems ("one size does not fit all").
She believes a mandatory treaty would block the future adoption of domestic law
related to newly arising situations. Second, she claims that an international treaty
would require a lot of effort and money for meetings, translation, and travel, which
could be saved by replacing a treaty with expert advice on modification to national
legislation. Third, she argues that an international treaty regarding exceptions and

103WIPO Study, supranote 1, at 134.
104Id
105P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an InternationalInstrument on Limitations and

Exceptions to Copyright, OPEN

SOCIETY INSTITUTE 49 (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nU

publications/hugenholtz/limitations exceptions copyright.pdf.
'°' Id. at43.
07 Id.

at 42.

108von Lewinski, supranote 19, at 85-117.
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limitations contradicts existing international conventions granting minimum
exclusive copyrights to authors. To von Lewinski, giving exceptions and
limitations to visually impaired persons shifts the focus in copyright law from
building a minimum level of rights protection to a minimum level of limitations.
Finally, von Lewinski claims that the idea of an international tool in favor of
visually impaired persons is contrary to Article 20 and 19 of the Berne Convention,
which leaves member states the freedom to grant "any greater protection" to
authors. 109
The basic assumption underlying all of von Lewinski's reasoning is her
objection to the concept of "user rights," and thus to any attempt to find a better
balance between copyright holders and the rights of specific users. von Lewinski
believes that WIPO's proposal, although dealing with the specific area of visually
impaired persons, hid a broader agenda on limitations. She writes: "[a]ll of these
... issues are diametrically opposed to the system of international copyright
protection existing for more than 120 years and thus require further scrutiny."
According to her, users have no rights with respect to copyright, and thus cannot
use international law to claim or enforce their rights. We disagree.1 0
As discussed above, copyright law must strike a complicated balance between
author and user rights. Copyright law, as any other law, must also constantly adjust
to technological advancement. What we have in the case of the visually impaired is
an example of advancing technology, serving fundamental human rights, which
cannot be used unless there are changes to copyright law worldwide.
Because copyright is now a strongly (though not perfectly) harmonized
international legal regime, the solution to the problem of the "book famine" must
The same arguments that
be obtained through an international instrument.'
supported harmonizing international copyright law to begin with support
harmonizing its exceptions and limitations. It is more efficient to invest efforts in
one international instrument than to implement individual and differing change in
dozens of individual countries.

'09Id. at 87-89, 103-05, 09, 111-13.
"o Id.

at 99, 107.

1 See discussion supraPart II.B.
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von Lewinski's concerns about costs are misplaced. WIPO covers many
expenses, based on its income from private entities that apply for WIPO's
intellectual property tools." 2
Representatives of publishers, mainly from the United States, had a strong
lobby in the WIPO committee meeting. This lobby, like von Lewinski, claimed that
soft law was a better solution because its constituents feared a "slippery slope"
effect. Publishers were afraid that allowing explicit copyright exemptions and
limitations to a specific group of people would crack copyright protection such that
other broader and less justified exemptions would follow.'1 3 It is important to note
that those publishers raising this argument nonetheless agreed to support the access
4
rights of people with print disabilities."1
Objectively, it is hard to understand this perspective. Many of the touted
benefits of soft law were noticeably inapplicable in this case. There was historical
precedent for this particular limitation and exception in individual countries. There
was little divergence of preferences, and many of the most powerful negotiating
countries already at least in part comply with many of the proposed requirements.
And more importantly, in the next sections we show why soft law would in
fact have been damaging to this instrument's stated goals.
C.

Non-binding Soft Law CouldLead to "DeadLetter"

The main drawback of a joint recommendation is that it would be nonbinding. Abbott and Snidal conclude that parties might prefer soft law when their
interests are to keep to a less legalized relationship." 5 A non-binding instrument,
however, would have turned the fundamental concept, which all countries agreed
upon, into an inert agreement."l 6 Countries would not have had to adopt or
implement a joint recommendation, so it would have changed little or nothing on
the domestic level. If a joint recommendation had been negotiated, countries may
have concluded that the problem has been resolved, and turned their attention

112

2010 Financial Statements, WIPO General Assembly, 20th Sess., Sept. 26 to Oct. 5, 2011,

WO/GA/40/12 (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/woga_40/
woga_40_12.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2012).
"' Scheinwald, supra note 19, at 469 (describing publishers associations who were firmly against a
treaty).
114

15

Id.

Abbott & Snidel, supranote 85, at 456.

116See

List of Proposals,supranote 10.
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elsewhere. A joint recommendation could have perpetuated the lack of access to
copyrighted products, as well as the lack of cross-border transfer of those products,
because the problem would have appeared to have been addressed where in fact
nothing changed on the ground.
The reason "dead letter" would have been so problematic here is that
countries did and do appear to want to effect real change. The use of soft law
sometime evidences a lack of true intent to solve a problem.1 17 In many
international settings, soft norms are created where countries never intend to make
them effective."' In this case, however, the different drafts initially proposed by
different negotiating groups all revealed a true intent to change the global legal
situation regarding access to copyrighted products for those people with print
disabilities." 9 It would have been unfortunate indeed if this genuine intent had not
been parlayed into an effective international instrument.
D.

Soft Law is a Less AppropriateSolution Where There Is
Already Consensus and Specificity, Rather than Aspirations

Almost all sides agreed that the problem needed to be addressed. The
specificity with which the proposed drafts addressed the problem also lead us to
conclude that soft law would not have been the appropriate mechanism.
Soft law may be the right mechanism when a firmer solution is not
available. 2 ° The difficulties of arriving at a clear solution may lead to the use of
soft law, containing vague and imprecise terms. Soft law may also outline
aspirational norms for issues, where the norm has not yet been established. 2' The
mechanism of soft law is thus more appropriate for general, new, or temporary
problems.
In this case, the subject matter is not general or vague. It is highly specific.
The subject matter is not new or spurred solely by technological development. It
was already included in the UN Convention discussed above, and has existed in

117Reisman, supra note 79, at 376.
I' Id. ("In many settings we have norms that are created with no intention of making them effective.").

"'Listof Proposals,supra note 10.
.20
Reisman, supra note 79, at 375-76.
...
Josd E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Hal) Truth and Consequences, 38 TEX. INTL. L.J. 405,
421 (2003).
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numerous domestic laws, and was contemplated when the three-step test was being
established.
Many soft laws are so vague or aspirational as to be functionally unworkable.
The four proposals for the international instrument regarding print disabilities,
including the proposal of the European Union, each reflect concrete workable
22

mechanisms.1

In short, the content of the draft proposals showed the following features even
at an early stage: the specificity of the subject matter, and the consensus that the
instrument should exist. Soft law is often used when specificity and consensus
cannot be achieved. It therefore would have been inappropriate to use it here.
E.

Soft Law Would Have Been Inefficient

Soft norms may incur long-term costs by being inefficiently vague, relative to
hard law.123 Countries, and domestic actors within countries, can incur huge costs
in trying to figure out how soft law fits into the existing legal landscape. The WIPO
Study observed that the problem of lack of access to copyrighted works by visually
impaired people exists in large part because of inefficiencies: in licensing between
private actors, but also in domestic understandings of complex international law.
Soft law would not have mitigated these inefficiencies; it may, in fact, have added
24

to them. 1

Mandatory rules are needed mainly in a situation of market failure, when the
free market cannot bring about the best solutions.'25 The local markets as well as
the global markets had in this case failed to provide adequate solutions. Countries
gave private actors the legal right to own and profit from their intellectual
property-the same property to which those with print disabilities deserve access.
The private actors holding the copyrights to these materials failed to make them
available at a reasonable price to this sector, demonstrating that the appropriateformat market was not to them a market worth pursuing. 126 Global markets have

122See List of Proposals,supra note 10.
'23
Reisman, supra note 79, at 377 ("[M]ost of the law that is made this way cannot be fulfilled in any
effective fashion, and this will have a long-term cost.").
124See WIPO Study, supra note 1.

125
von Lewinski, supranote 19, at 71.
126Scheinwald, supra note 19, at 511, 453 ("[G]lobal estimates place the current cost of reduced

productivity due to ...[Print impaired] status at almost $75 billion; this figure notably excludes the

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) e DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.338
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY

PAGE

I 286

OF

I

PITTSBURGH

VOL.

75

LAW

REVIEW

1 2014

also failed to enable the cross-border transfer of products from the place of origin
to other places that need the products.
Non-binding instruments could have perpetuated uncertainty. Domestic actors
might waste efforts and legal procedures in pursuing solutions suggested by a nonbinding instrument, when it is not clear that or where a non-binding instrument
takes precedent over existing domestic law or international requirements. The cost
of interpretation would have fallen on implementing countries and their domestic
actors, where a hard-law instrument would be clear that such measures must be
implemented.
Sometimes soft law can help countries avoid risks with respect to deep
political or economic involvement. Countries may agree to soft law in the first
place in order to keep the opportunity to avoid such cost and risk. However, this
instrument contained little such risk, even at an early negotiating stage. The risk
was merely over the question of who is going to pay for the cost of the accessible
products, not inherent in the subject matter of the instrument.

F.

Human Rights

The above arguments addressed the benefits of hard law primarily by
focusing on the instrument itself, in the context of WIPO as the negotiating forum.
In fact, however, this instrument was formed against another two areas of existing
international law: human rights law and international copyright law. This next
subsection discusses the human rights context, which we argue differs substantially
from subject matter areas where WIPO has used Joint Recommendations in the
past.
In the human rights context, a hard-law treaty already exists that addresses
this specific issue, but that treaty has failed to be effective because it has not been
domestically implemented. There is no interpretive gap for a soft law instrument to
fill in existing domestic law; the problem is that existing international requirements
have not been domestically implemented. This presents a significant contrast to the
areas of law addressed in previous Joint Recommendations, such as trademark,
where WIPO both made the initial hard law, and then used Joint Recommendations
to clarify its own hard-law treaty.

collective cost savings to all nations of health care, medical equipment and welfare payments that they
currently provide to [them].").
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For many years, UN treaties addressing human rights did not address the
rights of people with disabilities.127 Disabilities may be seen as medical or social
phenomena, and as long as disabilities were viewed as a medical issue, the solution
was perceived to be medical treatment rather than the protection of rights. 2 The
social approach focuses instead on disabilities as social phenomena. Under this
understanding, disability results from the interaction of persons with impairments
with attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others. 29 This understanding led to a
rights-based paradigm, focusing on both human rights and human dignity. 130
Understanding the role of society in protecting the rights of people with
disabilities empowers people with disabilities to transfer what was traditionally
viewed as a medical need into claimable rights.1 3' Recently, the notion of
protecting the rights of people with disabilities started to impact international
organizations, such as the United Nations. I32
The United Nations adopted the UN Convention of rights of people with
disabilities in 2006.' 33 The UN Convention refers to access by people with

.27Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting through the Lens of Mental Disability: The Proposed

InternationalConvention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity with Disabilities,41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 181, 182, 184 (2005). Many conventions protect racial minorities, migrants, women,
and children.
12s

Theresia Degener, DisabledPersons and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in HUMAN RIGHTS

(Theresia
Degener & Yolan Koster-Dreese eds., 1995). For further elaboration on this point, see generally Paul
Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, 2
DISABILITY, HANDICAP & SOC'Y 5 (1987).
AND DISABLED PERSONS: ESSAYS AND RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 9, 13

129UN

Convention, supranote 5, pmbl.

30Degener, supra note 128, at 27.
"a'

Dhir, supra note 127, at 194-96.

32 Many books published recently reflect the change in attitude regarding the rights of people with

disabilities. Although many of them deal with mental abilities, a lot can be learned about different types
of disabilities. See FRANCES OWEN & DOROTHY GRIFFITHS, CHALLENGES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
PEOPLE WITH

INTELLECTUAL

DISABILITIES

23-32 (2009);

MICHAEL L.

PERLIN,

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITIES LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 8-14 (2012);
BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PENELOPE WELLER, RETHINKING RIGHTS-BASED MENTAL HEALTH LAWS

52-54, 69-74 (2010).
133UN

Convention, supra note 5.
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disabilities to cultural products protected by intellectual property. 13 4 One hundred
and sixty countries ratified the UN Convention. 13 5 Nevertheless, the existence and
ratification of the UN Convention did not significantly change the situation on the
ground. Many of WIPO's member states did not comply with the UN Convention
36
by subsequently creating copyright limitations and exceptions.'
The broad, nonspecific nature of the UN Convention provision did not prove
itself capable of creating real change. Even though it is intended to be binding law,
the UN Convention uses general statements, without specific details as to
implementation. For example, the UN Convention does not explain the right way to
make changes in access rights-whether it should be done through new provisions
or new laws, or as part of limitations and exceptions to copyright. We refer to this
type of instrument, used by UN Convention, as hard-soft law.
We conclude that an international instrument that is both binding and detailed

is necessary to improve the implementation rate of the UN Convention's

requirements.
In the context of human rights law, then, WIPO's recently approved (although
not yet ratified) international instrument should be viewed as a second hard-law
attempt layered onto the UN Convention that should add a further step of hardness
37

to the previous instrument.'

This would make it effective as hard-hard law. Were

WIPO to have established only soft law on top of the UN Convention, nothing
would have changed. Countries that had not already implemented the UN
Convention's Article

30 would have no way to incorporate the new Joint

' UN Convention, supra note 5, art. 30 ("Participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport. (1)
States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to take part on an equal basis with others in
cultural life, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities: (a) Enjoy
access to cultural materials in accessible formats. .. (3) States Parties shall take all appropriate steps, in
accordance with international law, to ensure that laws protecting intellectual property rights do not
constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by persons with disabilities to cultural
materials.").
135There were 153 signatories to the Convention, and 106 ratifications. See Convention and Optional

Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/
countries.asp?navid= 17&pid=166.
136SCCR/22/18, supra note 9, at 14.
137US Signs WIPO Marrakesh Treaty On Copyright Exceptions For The Blind, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WATCH (Oct. 11, 2013, 4:14PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/10/ll/us-signs-wipomarrakesh-treaty-on-copyright-exceptions-for-the-blind/.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) o DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.338
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

THE

MARRAKESH

TREATY

FOR

VISUALLY

IMPAIRED

PERSONS

PAGE

1 289

Recommendation into domestic law through interpretation, because there are in
many countries no existing domestic provisions to be thus interpreted.'
The fact that such access rights are human rights adds another important point
to the discussion: it emphasizes the strength of the access right, which in itself
mandates hard law. As discussed, disabilities are now understood under a rightsbased paradigm, focusing on human rights and human dignity.' 3 9 Under the human
rights framework, countries must ensure meaningful rights of access to culture and
its products. If people with disabilities all over the globe have rights to access
culture products, that right should be cemented by an international hard-hard
convention. 140
As in many human rights contexts, there is a power imbalance between those
who have the right (persons with disabilities) and those that must protect it (here,
countries and the private sector). People with disabilities face collective action
problems in ways that publishers, for example, do not. In the human rights
framework, the rights of weaker sectors must be protected through international
hard law, or they will be negotiated away by stronger sectors or diffused through
soft law.
Human rights treaties often regulate the protection of the rights of the weaker
sector and the obligations and duties of the stronger sector. This complex structure
is more likely to work when each party is legally bound to perform its obligations,
and weaker parties are entitled to demand performance. Soft law does not provide
this structure.
G.

InternationalHardLaw May Help Developing Countries
Implement Legislation

Many visually impaired persons live in developing countries. Presumably,
those countries are the primary targets of any new international agreement, because

"I We discuss in the next subsection whether a Joint Recommendation could be "implemented" through
limitations and exceptions, and conclude that it would not be, but we do not see limitations and
exceptions as part of human rights law, so we do not discuss it here.
'39
Degener, supra note 128, at 27.
"0 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(fl), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948)
("Article 27 (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."). The International Covenants on
Human Rights has proclaimed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein,
without distinction of any kind. See Jenny Morris, Impairment and Disability: Constructingan Ethics of
Care Which PromotesHuman Rights, 16 HYPATIA No. 4, 1-16 (2001).
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many of them currently lack flexibilities in their copyright law to permit the
creation or importation of accessible materials. The international binding tool
adopted by WIPO can help ensure that developing countries change their national
legislation. Additionally, the international arena often favors the interests of
developed countries over developing countries; this binding tool empowers
developing countries faced with an international framework that otherwise does not
protect their citizens.
Hard law is a preferable tool when states want to bypass domestic political
conflict over particular issues.14' Certain developing countries face internal
difficulties in motivating national parliaments to modify their intellectual property
laws. Domestic organizations of disabled persons may lack the resources to lobby
for adding exceptions and limitations rules to existing national legislation. In these
cases, a binding international tool might be necessary to effect change.
From the international perspective, special consideration should be given to
the impact of international agreements on developing nations, where the need to
stimulate economic growth and improve living conditions is not just a local interest
but a global interest. When developing nations initially joined international
intellectual property instruments protecting copyrights and patent rights (such as
TRIPS), the argument was made that those agreements mainly served the interests
42
of developed countries. 1
Here, the international community could deliberately use a binding
43
international instrument to serve the interests of citizens of developing countries.1
There is precedent for such a step in the Doha Declaration, which recognized that
TRIPS in some cases collided with fundamental public health concerns,
particularly in the developing world.
The binding international agreement on these issues recognizes the hurdles
developing countries face both domestically and internationally. Practically
speaking, such an agreement helps ensure the adoption of domestic legislation in
developing countries, and also recognizes that the interests of the citizens in

'4'

Abbott & Snidel, supranote 85, at 431.

142Ruth Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 735 (1996); Ruth Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some
Implications of the Internationalizationof Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109,
111-12 (1995); see also Ruth Gana, Two Steps Forward:Reconciling Nigeria s Accession to the Berne
Convention and the TRPs Agreement, 27 TIC 476 (1996).
143
See List of Proposals,supra note 10.
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developing countries, which often get short shrift on the international stage,
deserve to be backed by binding, detailed international law.
V. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
We now turn to the status of international copyright law. Our basic

assumption is that among the principal motivations for an international instrument
on copyright exceptions and limitations for visually impaired persons is the need to
recognize limitations to copyright as internal to the copyright system and core to its
effective functioning. 1" We conclude that in the copyright context, the
international field is crowded with multiple hard-law agreements negotiated in
different forums, preventing local low-cost experimentation and norm-setting that
soft law can ordinarily provide. Because many developing countries do not
implement limitations and exceptions available to them under TRIPS and the Berne
Convention, but do implement hard law requirements from other agreements, a
Joint Recommendation, or even a binding treaty with vague provisions, would
likely have had little impact on the domestic level.
International copyright has been enacted in an increasingly complicated
landscape in which states forum shop to find the best forum for their interests. 145
Intellectual property has been addressed by WIPO, by the WTO in TRIPS, in
TRIPS-plus bilateral free trade agreements, and increasingly in TRIPS-plus
plurilateral agreements such as ACTA or the currently negotiated Trans Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP). The rules in different regimes speak to each other,

sometimes explicitly. For example, TRIPS imports the Berne Convention's threestep test for limitations and exceptions.' 46 Individual bilateral agreements also
officially recognize existing law, as discussed further below.
When a state does not like the standards in a particular forum, it will shift to a
more favorable forum. WTO is a harder-law forum, because of the availability of
dispute-resolution. It is arguable that the recent plurilaterals represent even harder
law, because they involve both enforcement and a greater power imbalance

'4 P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Contours of an InternationalInstrumenton Limitations and
Exceptions, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 473 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (in favor of general exceptions
and limitations to copyright by international instrument).
14' Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
IntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2004).
'46 See Berne Convention, supranote 21, at art. 9(2); TRIPS, supranote 21, at art. 13.
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between negotiating parties, such that compliance by the weaker party is easier to
achieve.
The network of intellectual property (IP) agreements evinces a trend of
"upward harmonization" aimed at making IP rights stronger, especially in
developing countries. 47 Regardless of one's assessment of the ultimate impact of
such harmonization, it is clear that it leaves less room for copyright limitations and
exceptions. Developing countries face substantial difficulties in implementing
TRIPS flexibilities even under TRIPS alone."' a We argue that the added layer of
TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements makes determining appropriate flexibilities even
more costly and difficult for those developing countries that are party to both
TRIPS and free trade bilateral agreements.
Against the existing international IP regime complex,149 binding (hard) law
was thus the better choice for this instrument. The traditional benefits of soft law
are foregone in the international copyright environment because the instrument will
have to interact with hard law developed in other forums. Soft law in this context
becomes harder to negotiate, and less flexible. The exploratory norm-setting
trumpeted by soft-law advocates is less viable against the hard-law requirements
emerging from other forums.
Part of this concern arises because both this instrument and hard law are
directed at developing countries, which tend not to fully exploit the room existing
in soft-law when confronted with hard-law obligations.
We delve into this in greater detail below.
A.

InternationalCopyright is a "Regime Complex," Which
Changes the Normal InteractionBetween Soft and HardLaw

International copyright is subject to what scholars call a "regime complex"-governance by multiple institutions with different actors and agendas. Several
features of regime complexes impact the traditional relationship between hard and
soft law. First, negotiations in one forum do not begin with a blank slate, or even

"' Amy Kapczynski, Harmonizationand Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India's PharmaceuticalSector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1571 (2009).
141Id. at 1574.

149Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L ORG.
277, 279 (2004) (describing a "regime complex" as "an array of partially overlapping and
nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area").
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with the most recent history of negotiations in that particular forum. Instead, they
are influenced by developments in related forums. Second, states will engage in
"forum shopping," '150 finding the best forum for advancing their political interests.
Powerful states are particularly adept at forum shopping.15 Third, legal
inconsistencies arise between the legal regimes in different forums, sometimes as a
' 52
result of deliberate state policy for the creation of "strategic inconsistencies."'
These features mean that states will choose to deploy hard and soft law to
interact not only as complements, but also as "mutually undermining
antagonists."' 53 This works roughly as follows. States shop for the forum that is
most conducive to their interests, and establish law there that is in dialogue with
law in other forums, often even referencing that other law in the text of new
agreements. The choice of hard or soft law in the new forum is made with the
knowledge that it speaks across forums. Because the law is established as the result
of a forum shift to better pursue a state's interests, it is likely to speak in opposition
to law in the other forums rather than in harmony with it.
When hard and soft laws are antagonistic rather than complementary, an
interesting transformation happens. Soft-law regimes harden, "losing the purported
soft-law advantages of flexibility and informality," and hard-law regimes may be
softened, as states and tribunals are encouraged to look at the legal provisions and
54
norms from neighboring regimes.
B.

TraditionalSoft-law Benefits are Foregonein the Context of
InternationalCopyrightLaw

The existing IP regime complex could have prevented a soft law instrument
from evincing many of the traditional benefits of soft law. Soft law is often praised
as being easier to negotiate. Here, the cost of negotiating the instrument was

0 Heifer, supra note 145, at 6 ("[D]eveloping countries and their allies are shifting negotiations to
international regimes.., more closely aligned with these countries' interests").
' Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: PoliticalEconomy and the
Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, 60 STAN. L. REv. 595, 596-97 (2007).
152DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLrrIcs Is GLOBAL: ExPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY

REGIMES 5-6 (2007).
153Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 81, at 728. Shaffer and Pollack explain that "distributive conflicts
among states, and in particular among powerful states, coupled with the coexistence of hard- and softlaw regimes within a regime complex ... is most likely to undermine the smooth and complementary
interaction of hard and soft law depicted in so much of the literature." Id. at 741.
154 1d. at 710-11.
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already high, even if the result would have been nonbinding. The situation was
similar to what happened in the United States' involvement in the UNESCO
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions:' 55 states are not fooled by the fact that an instrument presents itself as
soft law. Instead, they are aware of its potential significance for their interests in
other forums. Thus, the instrument would have been difficult to negotiate
regardless of whether it was binding.
Second, soft law is usually praised for allowing norm experimentation. But if
the instrument had been soft law, it would not have left room for norm
experimentation by countries, because a web of hard copyright law already exists
in the area. The result of this web is that many countries, particularly developing
countries, have implemented hard law but have not exploited the softer law aspect
of limitations and exceptions. To be effective, the treaty has to stand up against this
emerging hard-law regime of bilaterals and plurilaterals.

C. Because LanguageHas Been Soft, Limitations and
Exceptions Have Not Been Adopted to the FullExtent by
Developing Countries
Because the existing language on copyright limitations and exceptions has
been vague, or "soft," developing countries have not taken full advantage of
copyright limitations and exceptions. 156 The three-step test permits a great range of
limitations and exceptions, including but not limited to: personal use, criticism,
educational purposes, reproduction by the press, ephemeral recordings, library
exceptions, exceptions for computer interoperability, and exceptions for people
with disabilities.157 However, most developing countries provide only a limited
range of limitations and exceptions, and make little use of flexibilities that could
help improve access to education or distance leaming.158 Few developing countries
have employed the mechanisms of the Berne Appendix, which permits compulsory
licensing to promote access to works published abroad.
The lack of limitations and exceptions in developing countries stems at least
in part from the fact that specific examples are not spelled out in the text of

...
UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
pmbl., Oct. 20, 2005, 45 LL.M. 269; see Shaffer & Pollack, supranote 81, at 771-73.
156DEERE, supranote 100.
57

1 Id. at 90.

.5 Id. at91.
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international law. Because the language of the limitations and exceptions three-step
test itself is soft-permissive and imprecise-countries with little existing
copyright law and low capacity for implementation are unlikely to expound on its
details when implementing hard law.
D.

Bilateralsand PlurilateralsContain Even Fewer Provisions
on Limitations and Exceptions

This problem-the lack of implementation of limitations and exceptions-is
exacerbated by the fact that many of the newer TRIPS-plus agreements contain
very little language on copyright limitations and exceptions. These newer
agreements do, however, contain a lot of language creating harder copyright law.
We discuss a few examples of this: the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), and the Chile-US
Free Trade Agreement (Chile FTA).
ACTA, a plurilateral agreement, does not contain the three-step test. The only
explicit mention of limitations and exceptions occurs in Article 27.8, concerning
electronic rights management systems. There, ACTA explains that a party may
adopt or maintain "appropriate limitations and exceptions" to measures
implementing the requirements for electronic rights management, and that any
obligations are without prejudice to the limitations, exceptions, or defenses
available under a Party's law. 159 Article 1 of ACTA also states that "[n]othing in
this Agreement shall derogate from any obligations of a Party with respect to any
other Party under existing agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement."' 60 This
presumably incorporates the three-step test into ACTA, or at least prevents
ACTA's positive provisions from overruling it.
With respect to ACTA, any new proposed instrument needs to provide an
obligation rather than a suggestion to have an impact on ACTA signatories,
because Article 1 defers only to the other "obligations" of Parties, under existing
agreements. Were the Marrakesh Treaty to have been not binding, it would not
have been seen as an "obligation," and thus would have no chance of carving a hole
in the ACTA hard-law copyright regime. Even as a hard-law treaty, the new WIPO
instrument may be deemed by ACTA signatories to not be an "existing agreement,"
giving rise to an argument that the Marrakesh Treaty should not be deferred to.

159Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 27.8, Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M 243 [hereinafter ACTA],
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/iproperty/pdfs/actal 105_en.pdf.
160 Id. at art. 1.
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However, it is arguable that the Marrakesh treaty falls under existing agreements as
part of the WIPO regime, in further articulating exceptions and limitations covered
in the Berne Convention. What is important to note is that ACTA does not defer to
WIPO interpretations, only to obligations. If WIPO had adopted a joint
recommendation instead of a treaty, ACTA signatories may have had a hard time
arguing that ACTA parties would be permitted to follow its recommendations.
We now turn to some of the bilateral agreements as further examples of this
problem. The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) recognizes the
WIPO regime. It requires both parties to ratify or accede to the Berne Convention,
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty. 161 This recognition of the WIPO regime lays the groundwork for
recognition of another binding WIPO treaty. There is no reference, by contrast, to
any WIPO soft law. The KORUS FTA imports the Berne three-step test in footnote
11.162 Because this test originated in WIPO, WIPO interpretations of the test
through subsequent agreements are arguably authoritative. The more binding the
WIPO interpretation, the more effective it is likely to be in expounding on this
provision.
As a last example, we turn to the Chile-US Free Trade Agreement (Chile
FTA). The Chile FTA is arguably a less restrictive bilateral. It contains a section on
copyright limitations and exceptions. 163 That section in turn has a footnote that
explicitly links the three-step test to WIPO's interpretive mechanism: the three-step
test articulated in the FTA "neither reduces nor extends the scope of applicability
of the limitations and exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention, the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (1996), and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(1996)."164 This ties the enforcement of this bilateral to WIPO's interpretation of
limitations and exceptions.

161

Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 18.1.3(c), June 20, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642 [hereinafter

KORUS], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text.
162 Id. at

art. 18.4.1 n. 11 ("Each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to the rights described in

paragraph 1 to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work,
performance, or phonogram, and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder. For greater certainty, each Party may adopt or maintain limitations or exceptions to the rights
described in paragraph 1 for fair use, as long as any such limitation or exception is confined as stated in
the previous sentence.").
163Free

Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.7.3 n.17, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter Chile

FTA], availableat http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text.
164Id.
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The Chile FTA also contains a provision on non-derogation, explaining that
"[n]othing in this Chapter concerning intellectual property rights shall derogate
from the obligations and rights of one Party with respect to the other by virtue of
...multilateral intellectual property agreements concluded or administered under
the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). ' 165 This
contemplates deference to future WIPO agreements, in addition to present ones.
Thus the Chile FTA gives WIPO more authority, and explicitly contemplates
deference to future hard-law agreements developed in the WIPO regime. WIPO has
the opportunity with this present instrument to establish a new obligation to
counterbalance the requirements of bilateral trade agreements such as the Chile
FTA.
In sum, international copyright law now includes a snarl of smaller hard-law
agreements. These agreements establish hard law copyright requirements, but no
mandatory specific limitations and exceptions. Developing countries have not
adopted the range of limitations and exceptions permitted under TRIPS and the
Berne Convention. Developing countries have, however, adopted the other hard
law requirements imposed by bilateral free trade agreements. The hard-law
bilateral agreements generally recognize WIPO hard-law treaties and other
"obligations," but for the most part do not acknowledge WIPO Joint
Recommendations or other soft law.
Thus, for developing countries that are party to plurilateral or bilateral hardlaw agreements, it was necessary that WIPO mandate new copyright limitations
and exceptions as binding hard law. Otherwise, developing countries might not
have implemented the new instrument out of fear of how it will interact with their
bilateral obligations. At the least, a soft law instrument would have generated
massive inefficiencies as developing countries tried to determine how it fits into
their hard-law obligations in other regimes.

VI. How THE MARRAKESH TREATY IS SITUATED AGAINST
OTHER LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
The task of developing a global approach to limitations and exceptions is one
of the most difficult challenges facing the international copyright system today.' 66
Some argue for broad international language, in the interest of preserving the
autonomy of individual countries and the existence of alternate systems such as fair

65

Id.at art. 17.1.5.

16See Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 144, at 473.
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use. Others argue for the specific enumeration of limitations and exceptions, to
ensure that minimum exceptions are preserved internationally. The current
discussion over an international exception for visually impaired persons need not
force a decision on these issues. As a binding agreement, clarifying that exceptions
for the visually impaired are internationally mandated, the treaty reflects an
existing consensus among most developed countries and extends that consensus to
developing countries only with respect to this one specific exception. The
remaining scope of limitations and exceptions will not be affected by such a treaty.
Okediji and Hugenholtz, for example, identify three attributes that should be
reflected in a general international instrument on exceptions and limitations, should
such an instrument ever be created. They claim that any international instrument on
copyright exceptions and limitations should be (i) flexible; (ii)judicially
manageable; and (iii) leave ample space for national cultural autonomy. Therefore,
they conclude that softer law might be preferable. This reasoning does not apply to
the Marrakesh Treaty for the visually impaired. Recognizing an exception for the
visually impaired and mandating that countries implement it domestically does not
prevent countries from creating additional copyright exceptions, and thus does not
deprive domestic copyright systems of their potential flexibility. In other words, the
current instrument mandates a minimum, but does not define an entire copyright
limitations and exceptions system. The current Treaty leaves space for cultural
autonomy, as this exception does not rely on cultural presumptions about parody or
reuse. Instead, it articulates a consensus view about a limitation concerning a
fundamental human right articulated by the UN. Therefore, for this particular
instrument, hard law does not present the problems Okediji and Hugenholtz
anticipated being raised by a hard law instrument.
Deciding whether the agreement would be a binding treaty instead of a joint
recommendation was clearly not the end of the matter, even with regards to the
debate over hard and soft law. As discussed in Section Ill(A), international
agreements vary in hardness across multiple dimensions, and one of those
dimensions is the specificity of content. We have focused most of this paper on the
dimension of obligation-whether countries are obligated to implement the
agreement or permitted to ignore it as mere suggestion-because it was a crucial
first decision.
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However, the depth of detail in the content of the treaty was also important.
As mentioned above, hard law may appear at different levels of hardness. 167 There
are three main criteria of an agreement's "hardness": obligations and the intent to
be obligated, precise content, and third party authority and enforcement power.
International law is thus not simply hard or soft, but rather harder or softer.
Not only do laws vary from harder to softer, but they may also be harder or softer
in different ways. Countries can agree on a binding tool containing precise
definitions, but decide not to employ enforcement tools. They can alternatively
employ an enforcement power, but make broad statements that are easily
interpreted to permit a wide variety of behavior. Even if an agreement is binding
and must be implemented, it can still be harder or softer along other dimensions.
The concluded Marrakesh Treaty is not only binding, it also contains specific
requirements that contemplate real-world application. The treaty requires member
states to enact a domestic copyright exception if they lack one.' 68 But it addresses a
number of very specific issues in depth, including digital locks (TPM) and cross69
border exchange.'
The concluded treaty, like all WIPO treaties, is not subject to an enforcement
power. However, it enables "authorized entities"-non-profits, for-profits that
provide works on a non-profit basis, and government agencies-to export
accessible works.

17 °

This enablement empowers those authorized entities as

domestic actors who will be interested in getting the exceptions locally adopted.
The treaty also empowers the visually impaired to seek local implementation, by
permitting them to import accessible works. 7 ' The treaty thus empowers local
actors, treaty in hand, to approach their governments in the name of interests
recognized in the treaty.

167See Alan Boyle, Soft Law in InternationalLaw-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 141, 142 (Malcolm

D. Evans ed., 2d 2006); see also Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 144, at 474 (for example, if an
international agreement reflects the parties' intent to be bound, then in principle such an agreement
could also constitute hard law even if technically it is not labeled as a treaty).
168See

Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 74, at art. 4.

169Id. at arts.

5-7.

170Id. at art. 2(c).
171Id. at arts. 5, 6.
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CONCLUSION

WIPO's member states were correct when they decided to use a hard-law
instrument to protect access rights for visually impaired people. The choice of
making the instrument a treaty will prevent the creation of yet more inert
international law. Soft law would not have been sufficiently strong to protect the
human rights of those with print disabilities. And in the international copyright
context, hard law was necessary because the treaty needed to push back against the
complicated web of hard law already existing in different forums. A softer
approach would have resulted in a decreased likelihood of implementation by
developing countries as well as an ineffective instrument that would have been both
less rigorously complied with and less effective in achieving its outcome.
As of the writing of this paper, the Marrakesh Treaty has been signed by fiftyseven countries, including the United States but not the EU, and it has not yet been
ratified.172 What remains to be seen now is whether domestic policies and politics
will permit ratification and implementation of this international solution to a human
rights problem of global proportion.

1

SOS: Unclear, torturouspathfor EU ratificationof Marrakesh Treaty, TRANSATLANTIC CONSUMER

DIALOGUE IP POLICY COMMITTEE BLOG, http://tacd-ip.org/archives/1082 (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
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